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У статті  виявлено особливості тлумачень  мислителями Нового часу 
основних категорій моральної і релігійної свідомості (благо, віра, істина, 
любов, мораль, спасіння, чеснота та ін.) в їх взаємозв’язку. Звернення до 
історико-генетичного методу і методу категоріального аналізу дозволило 
розкрити філософський зміст основних концепцій взаємозв’язку релігії і моралі 
в новочасній культурі і виявити їх причетність до процесів, що відбуваються в 
європейському духовному просторі сьогодення. Отримані результати надають 
можливість подальшого теоретичного опрацювання багатої ідейної спадщини 
Нового часу і пошуків вирішення практичних завдань щодо формування 
моральних засад людського життя в епоху гострої духовної кризи сучасного 
європейського світу.   
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чистота. 
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В статье выявлено особенностеи истолкований мыслителями Нового времени 
основных категорий морального и религиозного сознания (благо, вера, истина, 
любовь, мораль, спасение, добродетель и др.) в их взаимосвязи. Обращение к 
историко-генетическому методу и методу категориального анализа позволило 
раскрыть философское содержание основных концепций взаимосвязи религии и 
морали Нового времени и выявить их причастность к процессам, 
происходящим в европейском духовном пространстве современности. 
Полученные результаты дают возможность дальнейшего исследования 
богатого идейного наследия Нового времени и поисков решения практических 
задач по формированию нравственных оснований человеческой жизни в эпоху 
острого духовного кризиса современного европейского мира.   
Ключевые слова: благодать, вера, добродетель, истина, любовь, мораль, 
религия, чистота. 
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The article shows the development of specific of interpretations the main categories 
of Moral and Religious Conciousness in the New Ages (faith, grace, love, morality, 
purity, religion, truth, virtue). Historical and genetic method and method of category 
analyses gives the possibilities to uncover the philosophical sense of the main 
conceptions of  New Ages of correlation Morality and Religion and to develop their 
relation with the process in the European spiritual spread of our days. 
The results of this study allow to make further searches of rich intellectual 
inheritance of  New Ages and to search for the decision the practical problems of 
moral bases of people’s life in the time of the hard spiritual crisis of modern 
European world.  
Keywords: faith, grace, love, morality, purity, religion, truth, virtue.  
Introduction. 
The Renaissance humanism and New Age accepted the idea of exceptional 
human dignity in Christianity.  Specificity of New Age was the desire to justify the 
value of the human person apart from religion. And while Christianity insists on the 
primacy of transcendental, suprapersonal realities, New Age puts this reality into the 
human subject. While in the Middle Ages, even non-religious morality was subject of 
religion, in the era of New Age even religious morality was the output of the human 
person. True morality within the person and the value of its virtues were associated 
with the fact of free, independent and informed choice of the individual. 
I. Kant claims and justifies the final and complete priority of moral over all 
other areas of the human spirit. Philosopher puts the problem of balance of morality 
and religion with the utmost, hitherto unprecedented clarity. “Morality in its purity 
and whiteness should be linked with religion, that wasn’t comprehended by the 
ancient philosophers” [5, p. 94]. He implemented a truly grand plan of moral 
autonomy, subordinating all human activity to the task of moral self-improvement 
and education of the individual. According to I. Kant, knowledge hasn’t got value 
unless it helps a person to realize good in his life. Faith is justified only if it helps to 
follow duty everywhere and always. Kant affirmed the autonomy of morality. 
“Morality does not require religion, by pure practical reason it tends to itself” [6, p. 
261]. However, for Kant, mere human efforts aren’t enough to fully realize the vision 
of the supreme good, which morality includes. One must “posit the existence of God 
as that referring to the possibility of the supreme good” [3, p. 377]. All moral 
precepts would have no power if it were not a perfect being who perceives them. 
“Religion provides morality with strength, beauty and reality, because morality itself 
is something perfect... Religion is what gives moral weight; it should be the motive 
for morality” [5, p. 94]. Morality would remain in the noumenal world, if it were not 
a Creature that makes morality in its entirety. “It is also impossible to appeal to 
morality without believing in God” [5, p. 94]. Religion is embodied morality, its 
strength.                 
According to I. Kant, the real guarantee of moral world order can only be God. 
Existence of God that isn’t proved by any theoretical arguments of reason is a 
postulate of practical reason” [1, p. 321]. Knowledge – both in morality, and in 
religion – isn’t of decisive importance. “I had to eliminate the knowledge to make 
space for faith” [4, p. 43]. Taking away from the mind claims to transcendental 
knowledge (to excessive generalization), Kant thus vacated the seat to faith. 
“Dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e. prejudice that it’s possible to succeed in it without 
the critique of pure reason, is the true source of disbelief (contrary to morality), 
which is always highly dogmatic” [4, p. 43]. Not faith is dogmatic, but mind that 
claims to knowledge beyond experience. Critique of pure reason, Kant believes, “puts 
the end to all attacks against morality and religion” [4, p. 43]. Separating, on the one 
hand, the field of knowledge, and, on the other hand, the field of morality and 
religion, he thus has limited knowledge that it would not play a decisive role in 
morality and religion.  
God is not a matter of reason, but the condition of morality. God is neither the 
source nor the cause of morality. According to Kant, God is a hypothesis. “God is not 
a creature beyond me, but just my opinion” [2, p. 376]. Thus understandable God is 
not an external authority to humans and is recognized as a condition of morality that 
is the very possibility of moral acts. “It’s not so important for us to know what God 
Himself is (by nature) as what He is for us as a moral being” [6, p. 370]. I. Kant 
considers the existence of God not in the cognitive, but in a purely moral context. 
According to Kant, it would be immoral to treat God as anthropomorphic being, thus 
humiliating Him. The only thing to be pious is the attitude toward God as holy 
legislator, benevolent ruler and righteous judge. According to Kant, these moral 
properties of God are needed as much as they may give great efficiency to moral 
qualities.  Knowledge of God as a moral being is the essence of theology of natural 
religion.      
The idea of moral purity and religious experience from empirical principles is, 
so to speak, a nerve of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. The principles of pleasure, 
benefits, profit, and happiness are not acceptable to justify morality. His ethics of 
duty confronts empirical ethics. Only an act which is motivated by duty can be 
considered truly moral. Purity of moral motives is unbreakable. I. Kant understands 
the limitations of reason in justification for the idea of pure morality, as well as in 
resolving moral and religious issues, and therefore he justifies the importance of faith 
to morality and religion. “Faith in God, which, as a practical faith, derived from the 
principle of morality is so powerful that no speculative counterproofs are able to 
wrest it from the moral sense” [5, p. 93]. Faith is inevitably mentioned in human 
behaviour, where the need is not thinking, but action in accordance with the ideal. 
Reason for Kant, can not give such unshakable foundation, since it’s connected with 
contradictions, and moral action requires absolute rather than problematic belief in 
the rightness of actions undertaken.        
In morality and religion, Kant attached the utmost importance to the faith. “As 
the man himself can not realize the idea of the highest good, inextricably linked with 
the purely moral direction of thoughts, he finds for himself necessary belief in 
assistance or existence of moral world-keeper, only through which this goal is 
possible” [6, p. 370]. And if faith has subordinate position in knowledge, in religion 
and morality it is indispensable. According to Kant, there are three kinds of faith. 
Pragmatic faith is a faith of man in his innocence in a particular case. Doctrinal belief 
is a belief in the general provisions, or otherwise, the faith of reason. These kinds of 
faith, according to Kant, are unstable and contingent. A moral belief has quite a 
different character – “nothing can shake it, because of moral principles that would be 
rejected in such a way” [4, p. 600].  Kant puts faith in God dependent on morality. To 
believe in God means not to think about his existence, but to strive to be good. Kant 
valued knowledge more than dogmatic and doctrinal belief, but he put moral faith 
above knowledge, thus assuring the primacy of practical reason over theoretical. Only 
pure religious faith or otherwise, faith of reason, according to Kant, can serve as a 
basis for true religion, because it might be clearly informed to anyone who has a 
mind.            
I. Kant distinguishes between the concept of “faith” and “religion”. There is 
only one true religion, but there may be different types of faith. Therefore it’s more 
appropriate to say “a man of a particular faith” instead of “a man of a particular 
religion”. Church faith is historically conditioned.  But this isn’t for pure faith of 
reason, which is the basis of moral religion. Historical faith, says Kant, has got pure 
religious faith as its supreme interpreter. Kant spread the idea of “pure morality”, free 
from everything empirical, on the religion as well. Purity of religious experience is 
possible only with pure morality. In this regard, Kant defines the Church as an 
association of people “based only on moral rather than any other motives” [6, p. 336]. 
Religion, by its content, is no different from morality. The purpose of religion of 
reason is “moral perfection of man” [6, p. 345]. There are just different kinds of faith, 
but religion is one as the only and true morality.    
Morality can not be derived from religion, because it precedes religion. 
Religion begins with a man and appears where there is a relation of man to God. Yet, 
says Kant, there are religions without morality. “There is no morality, but prudence 
and diligence of prudent conduct towards God” [5, p. 92]. He formulates problem of 
the correlation of morality and religion as a kind of moral problem: “morality should 
be linked with religion” [5, p. 94]. They are linked not in existential, but in the proper 
being. They are separated, but must be linked. Religion that does not involve morality 
reduces only to the outer ministry. Distinguishing “external” and “internal” religion, 
or in other words “religion of ceremonies” and “religion of mood”, Kant denies that 
the first one has the right to be called religion. “External actions can be either internal 
means of religion, or the consequences of it, but the outer religion is nonsense” [5, p. 
95]. True religion is “the religion of mood”, or otherwise “moral religion”. Religion 
necessarily involves moral and pure religion is actually “moral religion”, which is the 
knowledge of “all our commitments as divine commandments” [6, p. 380]. Exactly 
such a natural religion, according to Kant, should be completion of morality. It is the 
awareness of duty as divine commandments. It’s complemented with “the religion of 
revelation”, which, however, understands the divine commandments as a duty.               
Religion of revelation and natural religion are not opposed to each other but 
complement each other.  “Natural religion can be, at the same time, the religion of 
revelation” [6, p. 382]. Both of them posit proper life, coming to it from all sides. 
Awareness of the divine commandments as a duty and awareness of duty as divine 
commandments are essentially the same. Here it is important not how a person comes 
to the idea of duty, through reason or through faith in God, but it is important that he 
understands the proper and aspires to establish it in life. “Supernatural religion is an 
addition of natural one by higher divine help” [5, p. 96]. Natural religion is true, but 
incomplete, since it always implies only limited human effort to attain fullness of life. 
At the same time, only our moral behaviour makes us worthy of God’s help. 
Supernatural religion, taken by itself, is something passive. It implies that God is 
doing all instead of man, and man has no need to do something, because everything 
will happen without his participation. Then I. Kant concludes that if morality should 
be present in the actions, supernatural religion must be preceded by natural religion. 
Unlike I. Kant, L. Feuerbach refuses to withdraw morality and religion of 
transcendental principles. He goes against the “insensible” morality separated from a 
particular individual, and transfers its source on a real person. Morality is a real 
practical relation of one person to another. L. Feuerbach denies the possibility of the 
output morality of mind without correlation with feelings. Morality is not possible 
without the Kantian “autonomy”, but it does not exist without interpersonal 
relationship either. Another person is not an abstraction or scheme. Feuerbach 
defends the idea of a real, not an abstract man. He rejects the “absolute, immaterial 
speculation that draws material from itself” [8, p. 17], and affirms “the reality of 
being a single sense” [7, p. 79]. Along with the “speculative” morality Feuerbach also 
rejects speculative theology, which, in his opinion, opposes God as transcendent 
essence to human nature. God, spirit, soul are the empty abstractions for him. He 
proves that “the true meaning of theology is anthropology” and that “there is no 
difference between the divine and the human subject or nature – they are identical” 
[8, p. 21]. God is for Feuerbach the nature of man, not only alienation and 
objectification. Or, in other words, God is a kind of symbolic image of a purely 
human characteristics and qualities.   
L. Feuerbach rejects God as a transcendent entity, but not religion. “To be 
without religion is to think only of oneself; to have religion means to think about the 
others”. He wants to improve religion, not to cancel it. The true essence of religion 
lies in the nature of man. Religion is “the direct nature of man”. Feuerbach considers 
religion the necessary and logical step in the formation of human self-consciousness, 
his generic feature, for the animals don’t have religion. The fact that the gods were 
created in the image and likeness of people is the root of content and value of 
religious consciousness, the basis of its reality in history. God, according to 
Feuerbach, is the essence of man. Religion encourages loving God. So religion 
preaches eventually love man to man, which is the essence of morality. Religion is 
nothing other than morality. L. Feuerbach defends a religion without God, religion of 
the love of man to man.  
The essence of morality is the love of man to man. Feuerbach rejects the 
Christian thesis that “God is love”. He believes that religion is essentially immoral – 
not only in some of its manifestations. If love is the essence of religion, faith is its 
conscious form. Love identifies a person and God, and therefore man and man, 
combines them. And faith separates God from man, and therefore man from man, 
thus – separates them. Faith, in fact, is immoral. “Faith by its nature is bound and 
limited” [8, p. 288], it is always a belief in something definite, the only true. Faith 
involves fanaticism and intolerance towards all infidels. “So faith assimilates only 
believers and repels unbelievers. It is good towards believers and wicked towards 
non-believers” [8, p. 290]. Faith, according to Feuerbach, cannot be a criterion to 
distinguish between good and evil, because it is unstable and is based on a random 
feeling or mood. Randomness generally is the main subject of religion. Religion is 
something unintentional and involuntary, something independent from human 
knowledge and will, but at the same time – something that determined the fate of a 
person.        
Faith, according to Feuerbach, inevitably turns into hatred, and hatred in 
pursuit, unless meets on its way restrictions in the form of morality. Faith considers 
itself above the laws of morality.  “For faith there is nothing above itself, because its 
object is the divine personality” [8, p. 299]. Therefore, it makes achieving supreme 
bliss dependent on itself, not on performing common functions. Man, according to 
Feuerbach, is facing unresolved dilemma, because he has to sacrifice “both love for 
the personality of God and the personality of God for the sake of love” [8, p. 302]. 
Religion is opposed to morality, because faith is the opposite of love. “For faith man 
is exhausted by faith. Only faith contains all the virtues that make us pleasing to 
God” [8, p. 292]. Faith cancels moral and limits love. “Love in Christianity is 
contaminated by faith; it is not taken freely and in pure form. Love limited by faith 
isn’t real love” [7, p.117]. In this sense, love is identical with the mind only, not with 
faith, because mind and love are general in nature, and faith is always limited. 
Only for love Feuerbach reserves the right to be the basis of morality and 
religion. Love unites morality and religion. „Love is a connection, an intermediary 
between perfect and imperfect, sinful and sinless, general and individual, the law and 
the heart, God and human. Love is God Himself, and there is no God out of love“ [8, 
p. 79]. Love to man should be the supreme law for man. To love another person is 
impossible if you do not see in it the divine, akin to God, if you do not see God in it. 
„Man to man is God – that is the higher practical basic principle“ [8, p. 308]. 
Feuerbach considers it to be lost in Christianity.  Morality in Christianity is made the 
criterion of religion, but morality itself is subordinated to religion. God prevails over 
morality. Man thanks God for the blessings for him from another person, but doesn't 
thank the person. „In this way, – Feuerbach exclaims, –  the morale of religion dies“ 
[8, p. 310]. Morality unlike religion doesn’t separate, but unites people, being the true 
basis of religion and manifestation of true piety.  
When for Kant religion is the embodiment of morality, its completion, for 
Feuerbach morality as the moral attitude of one person to another, is the true meaning 
of religion. Morality is religion, they are identical. And if Kant’s morality is the 
essence of religion, it is, so to say, the idea of a religion – the fullness of morality, for 
Feuerbach, morality itself (and not “in itself”, as for Kant), that is, taken in empirical 
terms, is a true religion. “Feuerbach adores simple laws of human coexistence and 
morality” [2, p. 329], makes empirical ethics absolute. It strongly exacerbates Kant’s 
assertion that knowledge of God adds nothing to the morality of man, and argues that 
faith is opposed to love, being in fact immoral. Finally, L. Feuerbach offers a vast 
concept of transformation of philosophy. “The old philosophy had a double truth: the 
truth for itself, which did not care about the person – such is a philosophy, – and the 
truth for man – that is religion. In addition, the new philosophy as a human 
philosophy is essentially a philosophy for man; without affecting the dignity and 
autonomy of the theory, even in complete harmony with it, the philosophy has in fact 
a practical tendency, while practical in the highest sense; it stands instead of religion, 
it involves religion, it is truly – religion itself” [7, p. 204].  Moral philosophy should 
become the basis for true religion. Philosophy should replace religion. Remaining 
itself, philosophy must include all the benefits of religion. It is intended to become 
not only theoretical comprehension, but also a guide to happy life.  
Conclusions. 
The German classical philosophy clearly claimed the priority of morality over 
religion. This advantage in its extreme expression means that the idea of God is 
valuable only when promotes the moral improvement of man. In religion a person 
depends on God, but ultimately God himself depends on the person. God must be 
moral, and religion in its essence is nothing but morality. Morality is the true religion. 
The moral law is God. 
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